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Abstract—As the modern world becomes increasingly digitized
and interconnected, distributed signal processing has proven to
be effective in processing its large volume of data. However,
a main challenge limiting the broad use of distributed signal
processing techniques is the issue of privacy in handling sensitive
data. To address this privacy issue, we propose a novel yet general
subspace perturbation method for privacy-preserving distributed
optimization, which allows each node to obtain the desired
solution while protecting its private data. In particular, we show
that the dual variables introduced in each distributed optimizer
will not converge in a certain subspace determined by the graph
topology. Additionally, the optimization variable is ensured to
converge to the desired solution, because it is orthogonal to this
non-convergent subspace. We therefore propose to insert noise
in the non-convergent subspace through the dual variable such
that the private data are protected, and the accuracy of the
desired solution is completely unaffected. Moreover, the proposed
method is shown to be secure under two widely-used adversary
models: passive and eavesdropping. Furthermore, we consider
several distributed optimizers such as ADMM and PDMM to
demonstrate the general applicability of the proposed method.
Finally, we test the performance through a set of applications.
Numerical tests indicate that the proposed method is superior to
existing methods in terms of several parameters like estimated
accuracy, privacy level, communication cost and convergence
rate.
Index Terms—Distributed optimization, privacy, subspace,
noise insertion, consensus, least squares, LASSO.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a world of interconnected and digitized systems, new
and innovative signal processing tools are needed to take
advantage of the sheer scale of information/data. Such systems
are often characterized by “big data”. Another central aspect
of such systems is their distributed nature, in which the data
are usually located in different computational units that form
a network. In contrast to the traditional centralized systems,
in which all the data must be firstly collected from different
units and then processed at a central server, distributed signal
processing circumvents this limitation by utilizing the network
nature. That is, instead of relying on a single centralized
coordination, each node/unit is able to collect information from
its neighbors and also to conduct computation on a subset of
the overall networked data. This distributed processing has
many advantages, such as allowing for flexible scalability of
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the number of nodes and robustness to dynamical changes in
the graph topology. Currently, the computational unit/node in
distributed systems is usually limited in resources, as tablets
and phones become the primary computing devices used by
many people [1], [2]. These devices often contain sensors
that can use wireless communication to form so-called ad-hoc
networks. Therefore, these devices can collaborate in solving
problems by sharing computational resources and sensor data.
However, the information collected from sensors such as GPS,
cameras and microphones often includes personal data, thus
posing a major concern, because such data are private in
nature.
There has been a considerable growth of optimization
techniques in the field of distributed signal processing, as
many traditional signal processing problems in distributed
systems can be equivalently formed as convex optimization
problems. Owing to the general applicability and flexibility of
distributed optimization, optimization has emerged in a wide
range of applications such as acoustic signal processing [3],
[4], control theory [5] and image processing [6]. Typically,
the paradigm of distributed optimization is to separate the
global objective function over the network into several lo-
cal objective functions, which can be solved for each node
through exchanging data only with its neighborhood. This
data exchange is a major concern regarding privacy, because
the exchanged data usually contain sensitive information, and
traditional distributed optimization schemes do not address this
privacy issue. Therefore, how to design a distributed optimizer
for processing sensitive data, is a challenge to be overcome in
the field.
A. Related works
To address the privacy issues in distributed optimization,
the literature has mainly used techniques from differential pri-
vacy [7], [8] and secure multiparty computation (SMPC) [9].
Differential privacy is one of the most commonly used non-
cryptographic techniques for privacy preservation, because it
is computationally lightweight, and it also uses a strict privacy
metric to quantify that the posterior guess of the private
data is only slightly better than the prior (quantified by a
small positive number ). This method of protecting private
data has been applied in [10]–[16] through carefully adding
noise to the exchanged states or objective functions. However,
this noise insertion mechanism involves an inherent trade-
off between the privacy and the accuracy of the optimization
outputs. Additionally, some approaches [17]–[19] have applied
differential privacy with the help of a trusted third party
(TTP) like a server/cloud. However, requiring a TTP for
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2coordination makes the protocol not completely decentralized
(i.e., peer-to-peer setting). Consequently, it thus hinders use
in many applications in which centralized coordinations are
unavailable.
SMPC, in contrast, has been widely used in distributed pro-
cessing, because it provides cryptographic techniques to ensure
privacy in a distributed network. More specifically, it aims to
compute the result of a function of a number of parties’ private
data while protecting each party’s private data from being
revealed to others. Examples of how to preserve privacy by
using SMPC have been applied in [20]–[23], in which partially
homomorphic encryption (PHE) [24] was used to conduct
computations in the encrypted domain. However, PHE requires
the assistance of a TTP and thus cannot be directly applied in a
fully decentralized setting. Additionally, although PHE is more
computationally lightweight than other encryption techniques,
such as fully homomorphic encryption [25] and Yao’s garbled
circuit [26], [27], it is more computationally demanding than
the noise insertion techniques, such as differential privacy,
because it relies on the computational hardness assumption. To
alleviate the bottleneck of computational complexity, another
technique in SMPC, called secret sharing [28], has become
a popular alternative for distributed processing, because its
computational cost is comparable to that of differential privacy.
It has been applied in [29] to preserve privacy by splitting
sensitive data into pieces and sending them to the so-called
computing parties afterward. However, secret sharing gener-
ally is expensive in terms of communication cost, because
it requires multiple communication rounds for each splitting
process.
B. Paper contributions
The main contribution of this paper is that we propose
a novel subspace perturbation method, which circumvents
the limitations of both the differential privacy and SMPC
approaches in the context of distributed optimization. We
propose to insert noise in the subspace such that not only the
private data is protected from being revealed to others but also
the accuracy of results is not affected. The proposed subspace
perturbation method has several attractive properties:
• Compared to differential privacy based approaches, the
proposed approach is ensured to converge to the optimum
results without compromising privacy. Additionally, it is
defined in a completely decentralized setting, because no
central aggregator is required.
• In contrast to SMPC based approaches, the proposed
approach is efficient in both computation and commu-
nication. Because it does not require complex encryption
functions (such as those involved in PHE), it does not
have high communication costs (such as those required
in the secret sharing approaches).
• The proposed subspace perturbation method is generally
applicable to many distributed optimization algorithms
like ADMM, PDMM or the dual ascent method.
• The convergence rate of the proposed method is invariant
with respect to the amount of inserted noise and thus to
the privacy level.
We published preliminary results in [30] where the main
concept of subspace perturbation was introduced using PDMM
with one specific application, and here we give more complete
analysis of the proposed subspace perturbation and further
generalize it into other optimizers and various applications.
C. Outline and notation
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II reviews distributed convex optimization and some important
concepts for privacy preservation. Section III defines the
problem to be solved and provides qualitative metrics to
evaluate the performance. Section IV introduces the primal-
dual method of multipliers (PDMM), explaining its key prop-
erties used in the proposed approach. Section V introduces
the proposed subspace perturbation method based on the
PDMM. Section VI shows the general applicability of the
proposed method by considering other types of distributed
optimizers, such as ADMM and the dual ascent method.
In Section VII the proposed approach is applied to a wide
range of applications including distributed average consensus,
distributed least squares and distributed LASSO. Section VIII
demonstrates the numerical results for each application and
compares the proposed method with existing approaches.
The following notations are used in this paper. Lowercase
letters (x), lowercase boldface letters (x), uppercase boldface
letters (X), overlined uppercase letters (X¯) and calligraphic
letters (X ) denote scalars, vectors, matrices, subspaces and
sets, respectively. An uppercase letter (X) denotes the random
variable of its lowercase argument, which means that the
lowercase letter x is assumed to be a realization of random
variable X . null{·} and span{·} denote the nullspace and
span of their argument, respectively. (X)† and (X)> denote
the Moore-Penrose pseudo inverse and transpose of X , re-
spectively. xi denotes the i-th entry of the vector x, and Xij
denotes the (i, j)-th entry of the matrix X . 0, 1 and I denote
the vectors with all zeros and all ones, and the identity matrix
of appropriate size, respectively.
II. FUNDAMENTALS
In this section, we review the fundamentals and some
important concepts related to privacy preservation. We first
review the distributed convex optimization and highlight its
privacy concerns. Then we describe the adversary models that
will be addressed later in this paper.
A. Distributed convex optimization
A distributed network is usually modeled as a graph
G = (N , E), where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the set of nodes,
and E ⊆ N × N is the set of edges. Let n = |N | and
m = |E| denote the numbers of nodes and edges, respectively.
Ni = {j | (i, j) ∈ E} denotes the neighborhood of node i, and
di = |Ni| denotes the degree of node i.
Let xi ∈ Rui and si ∈ Rpi denote the local optimization
variable and input/measurement at node i, respectively. A
3standard constrained convex optimization problem over the
network can then be expressed as
min
xi
∑
i∈N
fi (xi, si)
s.t. Bi|jxi +Bj|ixj = bi,j ∀(i, j) ∈ E
(1)
where fi : Rui × Rpi 7→ R ∪ {∞} denote the local objective
function at node i, which we assume to be convex for all
nodes i ∈ N . Additionally, let vi,j denote the dimension of
constraints at each edge (i, j) ∈ E , Bi|j ∈ Rvi,j×ui , bi,j ∈
Rvi,j are defined for the constraints. Note that we distinct the
subscripts i|j and i, j, where the former is a directed identifier
that denotes the directed edge from node i to j and the later i, j
is an undirected identifier. Stacking all the local information
and let Nn =
∑
i∈N ui, Pn =
∑
i∈N pi, Mm =
∑
(i,j)∈E vi,j ,
we can compactly express (1) as
min
x
f(x, s)
s.t. Bx = b
, (2)
where f : RNn × RPn 7→ R ∪ {∞}, s ∈ RPn , x ∈ RNn ,
B ∈ RMm×Nn , b ∈ RMm . For simplicity, we assume the
dimension of xi of all nodes are the same and set it as u,
i.e., u = ui,∀i ∈ N and let all Bi|j be square matrices, i.e.,
vi,j = ui = u,∀(i, j) ∈ E . we thus have Mm = m × u
and Nn = n × u. We further define matrix B based on the
incidence matrix of the graph: Bi|j = I , Bj|i = −I if and
only if (i, j) ∈ E and i < j and Bi|j = −I , Bj|i = I if
and only if (i, j) ∈ E and i > j. Note that B reduces to the
incidence matrix if u = 1. To simplify notation, we will in
what follows drop the s-dependency in the objective functions
and simply write f(x) and fi(xi).
To solve the above problem without any centralized coordi-
nation, several distributed optimizers have been proposed, such
as ADMM [31] and PDMM [32], [33], to iteratively solve the
problem by communicating only with the local neighborhood.
That is, at each iteration (denoted by index k), each node
i updates its optimization variable x(k)i by exchanging data
only with its neighbors. The goal of distributed optimizers is
to design certain updating functions to ensure that x(k)i → x∗i ,
where x∗i denotes the optimum solution for node i. Generally,
these updating functions are functions of the input si.
B. Privacy concerns
As mentioned in the introduction, the sensor data captured
by an individual’s device are usually private in nature. For
example, health conditions can be revealed by voice signals
[34], [35], and activities of householders can be revealed
by power consumption data [36]. Therefore, we are able to
identity the local input/measurement si held by each node i
as the private data to be protected in the context of distributed
optimization. Recall that after each iteration, node i will
send the updated optimization variable xi(k+1) to all of its
neighbors. Since this variable is computed through a function
having the private data si as input, the revealed x
(k+1)
i leaks
information about si. This privacy concern, however, has not
been addressed in existing distributed optimizers. Therefore,
in this paper, we attempt to investigate this privacy issue
and propose a general solution to achieve privacy-preserving
distributed optimization.
C. Adversary model
When designing a privacy-preserving algorithm, it is impor-
tant to determine the adversary model that qualifies its robust-
ness under various types of security attack. By colluding with
a number of nodes, the adversary aims to conduct certain mali-
cious behaviors, such as learning private data or manipulating
the function result to be incorrect. These colluding and non-
colluding nodes are referred to as corrupted nodes and honest
nodes, respectively. Most of the literature has considered
only a passive (also called honest-but-curious or semi-honest)
adversary, where the corrupted nodes are assumed to follow
the instructions of the designed protocol, but are curious about
the honest nodes’ private data, i.e., the local measurements si.
Another common adversary is the eavesdropping adversary,
which can be internal or external with respect to the network
and also aims to infer the private data of the honest nodes. The
eavesdropping adversary in the context of privacy-preserving
distributed optimization is relatively unexplored. In fact, many
SMPC based approaches, such as secret sharing [29], [37],
[38], assume that all messages are transmitted through se-
curely encrypted channels [39], such that the communication
channels cannot be eavesdropped upon. However, channel
encryption is computationally demanding and is therefore very
expensive for iterative algorithms, such as those used here,
because they require use of communication channels between
nodes many times. In this paper, we design the privacy-
preserving distributed optimizers in an efficient way, such that
the channel encryption needs to be used only once.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Given the above-mentioned fundamentals, we thus conclude
that the goal of privacy-preserving distributed convex opti-
mization is to jointly optimize the constrained convex problem
on the basis of the private data of each node while protecting
the private data from being revealed under defined adversary
models. More specifically, there are two requirements that
should be satisfied simultaneously:
1) Output correctness: at the end of the algorithm, each node
i obtains its optimum solution x∗i and its correct function
result fi(x∗i ), which implies that the global function
result f(x∗) has been also achieved.
2) Individual privacy: throughout the execution of the al-
gorithm, the private data si held by each honest node
is protected against both passive and eavesdropping ad-
versaries; except for the information that can be directly
inferred from the knowledge of the function results and
the private data of the corrupted nodes (in section III-B3
we will explain this in detail).
To quantify the above requirements, two metrics must be
defined.
A. Output correctness metric
For each node i, achieving the optimum solution x∗i implies
obtaining the correct function output fi(x∗i ) as well. To
measure the output correctness for the whole network in
terms of the amount of communication, we thus use the mean
4squared error ‖x(k) − x∗‖22 over all the nodes as a function
of number of transmission: one transmission denotes that one
message package is transmitted from one node to another.
B. Individual privacy metric
We now define how to qualitatively measure the individual
privacy. Let Nc and Nh denote the set of corrupted and
honest nodes, respectively. Given that distributed optimizers
usually require an iterative process, the following criteria are
considered in evaluating individual privacy:
1) Local information leakage in each iteration: Without
loss of generality, we assume that the corrupted nodes are
attempting to infer the private data si of honest node i ∈ Nh.
In addition, let v(k)i denote the information collected by the
corrupted nodes at iteration k to infer information about the
private data si. The local information leakage of node i at
iteration k is measured by
`
(k)
i = I(Si;V
(k)
i ) = h(Si)− h(Si |V (k)i ), (3)
where I(· ; ·) denotes mutual information [40] and h(Si)
denotes the differential entropy of Si, assume it exists1.
2) Cumulative information leakage across all iterations:
At the end of the algorithm, the corrupted nodes can combine
all the information collected over all the iterations to infer the
private data si. Let Vi denote the set of cumulative information
Vi = {v(k)i }k∈K, where K = {0, 1, . . . ,K} denotes the set of
iterations. The cumulative information leakage becomes
`i = I(Si;V
(0)
i , . . . , V
(K)
i ). (4)
Of note, `(k)i ≤ `i as ∀k, v(k)i ∈ Vi.
3) Lower bound of information leakage: When defining the
individual privacy, we explicitly exclude the information that
can be deduced from the function output and the private data
of corrupted nodes, because each node will eventually obtain
its output from the algorithm, and in some cases, this output
may contain certain information regarding the private data
held by the individual honest node. To explain this scenario
more explicitly, take the distributed average consensus as an
example. A group of n people would like to compute their
average salary, denoted by save, while keeping each person’s
salary si unknown to the others. If the average result is
accurate, the salary sum of the honest people can always be
computed by
∑
i∈Nh si = n× save −
∑
i∈Nc si assuming the
adversary knows n, regardless of the underlying algorithms.
With the mutual information metric, the salary sum will leak
I(Si;
∑
j∈Nh Sj) amount of information about the salary of
the honest node i. Provided that this information leakage
is unavoidable, we therefore refer to it as the lower bound
of information leakage. A privacy-preserving algorithm is
considered perfect (or achieves perfect security) as long as
it reveals no more information than this lower bound.
Sufficient conditions for perfect security. Let the mutual
information I∗i denote the lower bound of information leakage
for node i. We conclude that perfect security can be achieved
1For the case that Si is a discrete random variable, the condition is given
by Shannon entropy H(Si)
if both the local and accumulative information leakage do not
exceed the lower bound. That is,
∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K : `(k)i ≤ `i ≤ I∗i . (5)
IV. PRIMAL-DUAL METHOD OF MULTIPLIERS
Among possible optimizers, we use PDMM to show the
proposed subspace perturbation because of its broadcasting
property (see Section IV-B), which allows for simplification
of the individual privacy analysis. Moreover, it yields further
insight into the constructed subspace. In Section VI we will
consider other distributed optimizers. Here we first provide a
review of the fundamentals of the PDMM and then introduce
its main properties, which will be used later in the proposed
approach.
A. Fundamentals
PDMM is an instance of Peaceman-Rachford splitting of
the extended dual problem (refer to [33] for details). It is an
alternative distributed optimization tool to ADMM for solving
constrained convex optimization problems and is often char-
acterized by a faster convergence rate [32]. For the distributed
optimization problem stated in (1), the extended augmented
Lagrangian of PDMM is given by
L(x,λ) = f(x) + (Pλ(k))>Cx+
c
2
‖Cx+ PCx(k) − 2d‖22,
(6)
and the updating equations of PDMM are given by
x(k+1) = arg min
x
L
(
x,x(k),λ(k)
)
, (7)
λ(k+1) = Pλ(k) + c(Cx(k+1) + PCx(k) − 2d), (8)
where P ∈ R2Mm×2Mm is a symmetric permutation ma-
trix exchanging the first Mm with the last Mm rows, and
d = 12 [b
> b>] ∈ R2Mm , c > 0 is a constant controlling the
convergence rate. λ(k) ∈ R2Mm denotes the dual variable at
iteration k, introduced for controlling the constraints. Each
edge (i, j) ∈ E is related to two dual variables λi|j ,λj|i ∈
Ru, controlled by node i and j, respectively. Additionally,
C ∈ R2Mm×Nn is a matrix related to B: C = [B>+ ,B>− ]>,
where B+ and B− are the matrices containing only the
positive and negative entries of B, respectively. Of note,
C + PC = [B>B>]> and ∀(i, j) ∈ E : λj|i = (Pλ)i|j .
B. Broadcast PDMM
On the basis of (7), the local updating function at each node
i is given by
x
(k+1)
i = arg minxi
fi(xi) + ∑
j∈Ni
λ
(k)>
j|i Bi|jxi
+
c
2
∑
j∈Ni
‖Bi|jxi +Bj|ix(k)j − bi,j‖22
 (9)
∀j ∈ Ni :λ(k+1)i|j = λ(k)j|i + c
(
Bi|jxi +Bj|ix
(k)
j − bi,j
)
.
(10)
We can see that updating λ(k+1)i|j requires only λ
(k)
j|i ,x
(k)
j
and x(k+1)i , of which λ
(k)
j|i and x
(k)
j are already available at
5node j. Thus, at each iteration, node i needs to broadcast only
x
(k+1)
i after which the neighboring nodes can update λ
(k+1)
i|j
themselves. As a consequence, the dual variables do not need
to be transmitted at all, except for the initialization step in
which the initialized dual variables λ(0) should be transmitted.
C. Convergence of dual variables
Consider two successive λ-updates in (8), in which we have
λ(k+2) = λ(k) + c(Cx(k+2) + 2PCx(k+1) +Cx(k)), (11)
as P 2 = I . Let H¯p = span(C) + span(PC) and H¯⊥p =
null(C>) ∩ null((PC)>). Denote ΠH¯p as the orthogonal
projection onto H¯p. From (11), we conclude that every two
λ-updates affect only ΠH¯pλ ∈ H¯p, and (I − ΠH¯p)λ ∈ H¯⊥p
remains the same. Moreover, as shown in [33],
(
I −ΠH¯p
)
λ
will only be permuted in each iteration and ΠH¯pλ will
eventually converge to λ∗ given by
λ∗ = −
(
C>
(PC)>
)†(
∂f(x∗) + cC>Cx∗
∂f(x∗) + cC>PCx∗
)
+ cCx∗.
(12)
We thus can separate the dual variable into two parts:
λ(k) = ΠH¯pλ
(k) + (I −ΠH¯p)λ(k),
→ λ∗ +
{
(I −ΠH¯p)λ(0), k even,
P
(
I −ΠH¯p
)
λ(0), k odd.
(13)
Below, H¯p and H¯⊥p are respectively referred to as the conver-
gent subspace and non-convergent subspace associated with
PDMM, and similarly ΠH¯pλ and
(
I −ΠH¯p
)
λ are called
the convergent and non-convergent component of the dual
variable, respectively.
V. PROPOSED APPROACH USING PDMM
Having introduced the PDMM algorithm, we now introduce
the proposed approach. To achieve a computationally and
communicationally efficient solution for privacy preservation,
one of the most used techniques is obfuscation by inserting
noise, such as in the differential privacy technique. However,
inserting noise usually compromises the function accuracy,
because the updates are disturbed by noise. To alleviate this
trade-off, we propose to insert noise in the non-convergent
subspace only so that the accuracy of the optimization solution
is not affected (see also Remark 3), thus achieving both privacy
and accuracy at the same time. The proposed noise insertion
method is referred to as subspace perturbation. Below, we first
explain the proposed subspace perturbation in detail and then
prove that it satisfies both the output correctness and individual
privacy requirements stated in Section III.
A. Subspace perturbation
Owing to the broadcasting property of the PDMM, after
transmission of the initialized dual variables, the updated
optimization variable xk+1i is the only information transmitted
in the network in each iteration. The main goal of privacy
preservation thus becomes minimizing the information loss of
si by revealing x
(k+1)
i . From (9), x
(k+1)
i is computed by
2
0 ∈∂fi(x(k+1)i ) +
∑
j∈Ni
Bi|jλ
(k)
j|i
+ c
∑
j∈Ni
(x
(k+1)
i − x(k)j −Bi|jbi,j), (14)
as Bi|jBj|i = −I and Bi|jBi|j = I . Note that only ∂fi(xi)
contains information about the private data si. Given that at
convergence x(k)j → x∗j and ΠH¯pλ(k) → λ∗, we then propose
to insert noise in the non-convergent subspace H¯⊥p , i.e., (I −
ΠH¯p)λ
(0), for perturbing ∂fi(xi), thereby protecting si. To
ensure that x(k+1)i does not reveal information about si, we
require
I(Si;X
(k+1)
i ) = 0. (15)
We have the following results.
Proposition 1. Let {Xi}i=1,...,n denote a set of continuous
random variables with mean and variance µXi and σ
2
Xi
,
respectively. Let {Yi}i=1,...,n be a set of mutually independent
random variables, i.e., I(Yi, Yj) = 0, i 6= j, which is also
independent of {Xi}i=1,...,n, i.e., I(Xi, Yj) = 0 for all
i, j ∈ N . Let Zi = Xi + Yi and Wi = XiYi, and let
Z ′i = Zi/σZi and W
′
i = Wi/σWi be the normalized random
variables with unit variance. We have
lim
σ2Yi
→∞
I(X1, . . . , Xn;Z1, . . . , Zn) = 0, (16)
lim
σ2Yi
→∞
I(X1, . . . , Xn;W1, . . . ,Wn) = 0. (17)
Proof. See Appendix A. 
With Proposition 1, we can see that the goal of privacy
preservation (15) can be realized by sufficiently obfuscat-
ing private data by using the subspace noise, i.e., the non-
convergent component of the dual variable (I − ΠH¯p)λ(0).
We then conclude that a sufficient condition to ensure (15) is
given by
∃j ∈ N hi : var
(
((I −ΠH¯p)Λ(0))j|i
)
→∞, (18)
where N hi = Ni ∩ Nh denotes the honest neighbors of node
i. By inspecting the above condition, we have the following
remarks.
Remark 1. (Information loss with finite variance) In Propo-
sition 1, we proved that the information loss regarding private
data becomes zero if the inserted noise has an infinitely
large variance, which is impossible to realize in practice.
To show that the proposed method is practically useful, i.e.,
when the noise variance is finite, the following result gives an
upper bound for the information leakage with Gaussian noise
insertion.
Proposition 2. Consider two independent random variables
X and Y and let Z = X + Y , where X denotes the private
data and Y denotes the inserted noise for protecting X . If
2Note that B>
i|j = Bi|j .
6we choose to insert Gaussian noise, the mutual information
I(X;Z) can be upper bounded by the following
I(X;Z) ≤ 1
2
log(1 + σ2X/σ
2
Y ), (19)
the equality holds when X also has a Gaussian distribution.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
From Proposition 2, we can see that the if the variance of
inserted Gaussian noise is 10 and 100 times the variance of
the private data, the maximal information loss is only 7×10−2
and 7× 10−3 bits, respectively.
Remark 2. (λ(0) ∩ H¯⊥p 6= ∅ can be realized by randomly
initializing λ(0)). Of note, [C PC] ∈ R2Mm×2Nn can be
viewed as a new graph incidence matrix with 2Nn nodes and
2Mm edges (see (c) in Fig. 1 for an example); we thus have
dim(H¯p) ≤ 2Nn− 1, and H¯⊥p is non-empty. For a connected
graph with the number of edges not less than the number
of nodes (i.e., Mm ≥ Nn), we conclude that a randomly
initialized λ(0) ∈ R2Mm will achieve λ(0) ∩ H¯⊥p 6= ∅ with
probability 1.
Remark 3. (No trade-off between privacy and accuracy) No
matter how much noise is inserted in the non-convergent sub-
space, the convergence of the optimization variable x → x∗
is guaranteed. By inspecting (6), we can see that the x-update
is independent of (I −ΠH¯p)λ as λ>
(
I −ΠH¯p
)
PC = 0.
Details of the proposed approach using PDMM are shown
in algorithm 1. And the analysis of both output correctness
and individual privacy is summarized below.
B. Output correctness
As proven in [33], with strictly convex f(xi), the optimiza-
tion variable x(k)i of each node i of the PDMM is guaranteed to
converge geometrically (linearly on a logarithmic scale) to the
optimum solution x∗i , regardless of the initialization of both
x(0) and λ(0), thereby ensuring the correctness. Moreover,
for convex functions that are not strictly convex, a slightly
modified version called averaged PDMM (see Section VII-C
for an example) can be used to guarantee the convergence.
C. Individual privacy
As stated before, we consider both passive and eavesdrop-
ping adversaries in this paper. From (18), we conclude that the
proposed algorithm achieves asymptotically perfect security
against a passive adversary as long as the honest node has at
least one honest neighbor, i.e., N hi 6= ∅. Additionally, because
privacy is ensured by λ(0), we conclude that the proposed
approach is also secure against an eavesdropping adversary
without requiring securely encrypted channels except for the
first iteration for transmitting the initialized λ(0).
VI. PROPOSED APPROACH USING OTHER OPTIMIZERS
In this section, we demonstrate the general applicability
of the proposed subspace perturbation method. In fact, the
proposed method can be generally applied to any distributed
Algorithm 1 Privacy-preserving distributed optimization via
subspace perturbation using PDMM
1: Each node i ∈ N initializes its optimization variable
x
(0)
i arbitrarily, and its dual variables λ
(0)
i|j , j ∈ Ni are
randomly initialized with a certain distribution with large
variance (specified by the required privacy level).
2: Node i sends the initialized {x(0)i ,λ(0)i|j } to its neighbor j
through secure channels [39].
3: while ‖x(k) − x∗‖2 < threshold do
4: Activated a node uniformly at random, e.g., node i,
updates x(k+1)i using (7).
5: Node i broadcasts x(k+1)i to its neighbors j ∈ Ni
(through non-secure channels).
6: After receiving x(k+1)i , each neighbor j ∈ Ni updates
λ
(k+1)
i|j using (8).
7: end while
optimizer if the introduced dual variables converge only in a
subspace (i.e., there is a non-empty nullspace), which is indeed
usually true, because these optimizers often work in a subspace
determined by the incidence matrix of a graph. To substantiate
this claim, we will show that the subspace perturbation also
applies to ADMM and the dual ascent method. We then
illustrate their differences by linking the convergent subspaces
to their graph topologies.
A. ADMM
Given a standard distributed optimization problem stated in
(1), the augmented Lagrangian function of ADMM [41] is
given by
L(x,v, z) = f(x)+v>(Mx+Wz)+
c
2
‖Mx+Wz−2d‖2,
(20)
where M ∈ R2Mm×Nn , like PDMM, is a matrix related to
the graph incidence matrix, and M = [B>+ ,−B>− ]>, W =[−I> − I>]> ∈ R2Mm×Mm . ν ∈ R2Mm and z ∈ R2Mm
are the introduced dual variables and auxiliary variable for
constraints, respectively. The updating function of ADMM is
given by
x(k+1) = arg min
x
L
(
x, z(k),ν(k)
)
(21)
z(k+1) = arg min
z
L
(
x(k+1), z,ν(k)
)
(22)
ν(k+1) = ν(k) + c
(
Mx(k+1) +Wz(k+1) − 2d
)
(23)
By inspecting the v-update in (23), we can see that it has a
similar structure to that of the λ-update in (11) of PDMM.
Let H¯a = span(M) + span(W ). For feasibility, we assume
d ∈ H¯a. Similarly to PDMM, in this process, every v-update
has effects only in
(
ΠH¯a
)
v ∈ H¯a and leaves (I − ΠH¯a)v ∈
H¯⊥a , H¯
⊥
a = null(M
>) ∩ null((W )>) unchanged.
Of note, ADMM is not a broadcasting protocol, i.e., it
requires pairwise communications for transmitting the dual
variable and auxiliary variable. The effects on privacy are
addressed below.
Remark 4. (Revealing the dual variables v and the auxiliary
variable z will not disclose more information than revealing
7the optimization variable x.) By inspecting (22) and (23), we
can see that at each iteration Si → X(k)i → Z(k)i|j and Si →
X
(k)
i → V (k)i|j both form a Markov chain. As a consequence,
for each honest node i, we have
∀j ∈ Ni : I(Si;Z(k+1)i|j ) ≤ I(Si;X(k+1)i ), (24)
∀j ∈ Ni : I(Si;V (k+1)i|j ) ≤ I(Si;X(k+1)i ), (25)
by the data processing inequality [40].
With the above result, we conclude that the proof for output
correctness and individual privacy using ADMM follows a
similar structure as that of PDMM; the only difference is
the constructed subspace. We thus conclude that privacy-
preserving ADMM can be achieved by subspace perturbation,
i.e., randomly initializing its dual variables ν(0) with a certain
distribution with a large variance.
B. Dual ascent method
The Lagrangian of the dual ascent method for solving (1)
is given by
L(x,u) = f(x) + u>(Bx− b), (26)
where u ∈ RMm is the introduced dual variable. The updating
function is given by
x(k+1) = arg min
x
L
(
x,u(k)
)
(27)
u(k+1) = u(k) + t(k)
(
Bx(k+1) − b
)
, (28)
where t(k) denotes the step size at iteration k. Likewise, the
u-update in (28) has a similar structure as the λ-update of
PDMM, wherein the convergent subspace is H¯d = span(B).
Moreover, as with ADMM, revealing the dual variable u
will not increase the information loss beyond revealing the
optimization variable x. Hence, we conclude that the proposed
subspace perturbation method also works for the dual ascent
method.
C. Linking graph topologies and subspaces
Thus far, we have shown that the dual variable updates of
PDMM, ADMM and the dual ascent method are dependent
only on their corresponding subspaces: H¯p = span(C) +
span(PC), H¯a = span(M)+span(W ) and H¯d = span(B).
Note that each of the matrices [C PC], [M W ] and B
can be seen as an incidence matrix of an extended graph,
therefore they all have a non-empty left nullspac for subspace
perturbation as long as m ≥ n (Remark 2). To examine the
appearance of these constructed graphs, in Fig 1 we give
an example of these extended graphs and provide illustrative
insights into the differences among these optimizers.
VII. APPLICATIONS
To demonstrate the potential of the proposed approach to
be used in a wide range of applications, we now present the
application of the proposed subspace perturbation to three fun-
damental problems: distributed average consensus, distributed
least squares and distributed LASSO, because they serve as
building blocks for many other signal processing tasks, such
as denoising [42], interpolation [43], machine learning [44],
[45] and compressed sensing [46], [47]. We first introduce
the application and then perform an analysis of the individual
privacy. We will continue using PDMM to introduce the
details, but the numerical results of using all the discussed
optimizers will be presented in the next section.
A. Privacy-preserving distributed average consensus
Privacy-preserving distributed average consensus is to esti-
mate the average of all the nodes’ initial state values over a
network and keep each node’s initial state value unknown to
others. Such privacy-preserving solutions are highly desired
in practice. For example, in face recognition applications,
computing mean faces is usually required, thus prompting
privacy concerns. Here, a group of people may cooperate to
compute the mean face, but none of them would like to reveal
their own facial images during the computation.
The optimization problem setup (1) becomes
min
xi
∑
i∈N
1
2
‖xi − si‖22
s.t. xi = xj ,∀(i, j) ∈ E .
(29)
The optimum solution for each optimization variable is x∗i =
n−1
∑
i∈N si and x
∗ = (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
n)
>. With PDMM, the
x
(k+1)
i computed by (14) becomes
x
(k+1)
i =
si +
∑
j∈Ni
(
cx
(k)
j −Bi|jλ(k)j|i
)
1 + cdi
. (30)
1) Individual privacy: Based on I(Si;X
(k+1)
i ), we analyze
the individual privacy. With (13), the numerator of (30) can
be separated as
si +
∑
j∈Ni
cx
(k)
j −
∑
j∈N ci
Bi|jλ
(k)
j|i −
∑
j∈Nhi
Bi|j
(
ΠH¯pλ
(k)
)
j|i
−
∑
j∈Nhi
Bi|j
(
P k
(
I −ΠH¯p
)
λ(0)
)
j|i
, (31)
where N ci = Ni∩Nc denotes the corrupted neighbourhood of
node i. At convergence, we have x(k)i → x∗i and ΠH¯pλ(k) →
λ∗ given by (12). We can see that the last term in (31) is
unknown to the adversary, and it can protect the private data
si with a sufficiently large perturbation. By applying (16)
in Proposition 1 with dimension n = 1, we can achieve
I(Si;X
(k)
i ) = 0 under the condition of (18). As for the lower
bound of information leakage, the revealed information would
be the partial sums of all the honest components (connected
subgraphs consist of honest nodes only) after removal of
all the corrupted nodes [30]. Denote the node set of the
honest component that the honest node i belongs to as C. The
lower bound of information leakage for node i thus becomes
I∗i = I(Si;
∑
j∈C Sj). Additionally, the cumulative informa-
tion leakage does not exceed I∗i , because manipulating the
information over all the iterations will reveal only the partial
sums. Hence, the proposed algorithm obtains asymptotically
perfect security in distributed average consensus applications,
because (5) is satisfied.
8Fig. 1: An example of graph topologies associated with dual ascent, ADMM and PDMM with u = 1: (a) A graph with n = 5
nodes and m = 6 edges. (b) The bipartite graph constructed by ADMM with n + m nodes and 2m edges. (c) The bipartite
graph constructed by PDMM with 2n nodes and 2m edges.
B. Privacy-preserving distributed least squares
Privacy-preserving distributed least squares aims to find a
solution for a linear system (here we consider an overde-
termined system in which there are more equations than
unknowns) over a network in which each node has only partial
knowledge of the system and is only able to communicate
with its neighbors, and in the meantime the local information
held by each node should not be revealed to others. More
specifically, here the local information of node i means both
the input observations, denoted by Qi ∈ Rpi×u, pi > u and
decision vector, denoted by yi ∈ Rpi . That is, each node i has
pi observations, and each contains an u-dimensional feature
vector. Collecting all the local information, we thus have Q =
[Q>1 , . . . ,Q
>
n ]
> ∈ RPn×u and y = [y>1 , . . . ,y>n ]> ∈ RPn ,
recall Pn =
∑
i∈N pi. The reason for identifying the private
data of each node i as the local information yi and Qi is
that they usually contain users’ sensitive information. Take the
distributed linear regression as an example, which is widely
used in the field of machine learning, and consider the case
that several hospitals want to collaboratively learn a predictive
model by exploring all the data in their datasets. Although
such collaborations are limited because they must comply with
policies such as the general data protection regulation (GDPR)
and because individual patients/customers may feel uncomfort-
able with revealing their private information to others, such as
insurance data and health condition.
The least-squares problem in a distributed network can
be formulated as a distributed linearly constrained convex
optimization problem, and the problem setup in (1) becomes
min
xi
∑
i∈N
1
2‖yi −Qixi‖22
s.t. xi = xj ,∀(i, j) ∈ E ,
(32)
where the optimum solution is given by x∗i =
(Q>Q)−1Q>y ∈ Ru,∀i ∈ N . With PDMM, the x-update
(7) for node i becomes
x
(k+1)
i = (33)
(Q>i Qi + cdiI)
−1
Q>i yi + ∑
j∈Ni
(cx
(k)
j −Bi|jλ(k)j|i )
 .
1) Individual privacy: To analyze how much information
the adversary would learn about the private data Qi and yi by
observing x(k+1)i , with (13), we can separate (33) into
(Q>i Qi + cdiI)
−1
∑
j∈Nhi
(
cx
(k)
j −Bi|j
(
P kΠH¯pλ
(k)
)
j|i
)
−
∑
j∈Nhi
Bi|j
(
P k(I −ΠH¯p)λ(0)
)
j|i +Q
>
i yi + cp
 , (34)
where cp =
∑
j∈N ci
(
cx
(k)
j − Bi|jλ(k)j|i
)
is known by the
adversary. Because both x(k)j → x∗j and ΠH¯pλ(k) → λ∗,
again, we use subspace noise, i.e., the non-convergent com-
ponent of the dual variable (I − ΠH¯p)λ(0), to protect the
private data. More specifically, the information loss regarding
the private data Qi and yi can be quantified by the mutual
information I(Qi, X
(k+1)
i ) and I(Yi, X
(k+1)
i ), respectively.
Given that λ(0) is independent of both Qi and yi, by applying
Proposition 1, we again can achieve I(Qi, X
(k+1)
i ) = 0 and
I(Yi, X
(k+1)
i ) = 0 as long as (18) is satisfied. Additionally,
collecting all the information over the entire iterative process
will not increase the information loss. We therefore conclude
that the sufficient condition (5) is satisfied. Hence, the pro-
posed approach achieves asymptotically perfect security in the
distributed least squares problem as well.
C. Privacy-preserving distributed LASSO
Privacy-preserving distributed LASSO aims to securely find
a sparse solution when solving an underdetermined system
(in which the number of equations is less than number of
unknowns). We thus have a network similar to the previous
least squares section but with the dimension Pn < u to
ensure an underdetermined system. The distributed LASSO
is formulated as a `1-regularized distributed least squares
problem given by
min
xi
∑
i∈N
(
1
2
‖yi −Qixi‖22 + α|xi|
)
s.t. xi = xj ,∀(i, j) ∈ E (35)
9(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2: Distributed average consensus with two different initializations of the dual variable with a variance of 106: convergence
of the optimization variable, the convergent and non-convergent component of the dual variable, using (a) dual ascent, (b)
ADMM and (c) PDMM.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 3: Distributed least squares with two different initializations of the dual variable with a variance of 106: convergence of
the optimization variable, the convergent and non-convergent component of the dual variable of (a) dual ascent, (b) ADMM
and (c) PDMM.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4: Distributed LASSO with two different initializations of the dual variable with a variance of 106: convergence of the
optimization variable, the convergent and non-convergent component of the dual variable of (a) dual ascent, (b) ADMM and
(c) PDMM.
where α the constant controlling the sparsity of the solution.
Because the objective function is convex but not strictly
convex, we use averaged PDMM to ensure convergence, the
x-updating function remains the same, and the λ-updating
function in (8) is replaced with a weighted average by
λ(k+1) = θ(λ(k) + cC(x(k+1) − x(k)))
+ (1− θ)
(
Pλ(k) + c(Cx(k+1) + PCx(k) − 2d)
)
, (36)
where 0 < θ < 1 is the constant controlling the average
weight. The output correctness is ensured by simply replacing
the equation (8) in step 6 of algorithm 1 with the above
equation. The analysis proof of individual privacy follows
similarly as the example for distributed least squares described
above. Hence, with (18), we are able to achieve asymptotically
perfect security in distributed LASSO.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, several numerical tests3 are conducted to
demonstrate both the generally applicability and the benefits
of the proposed subspace perturbation in terms of several
3The code for reproducing these results is available at
https://github.com/qiongxiu/PrivacyOptimizationSubspace
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Fig. 5: Convergence of the optimization variable in terms of three different privacy levels, i.e., approximately 7×10−3, 7×10−5
and 7×10−7 bits, for (a) proposed dual ascent (p-Dual), (b) proposed ADMM (p-ADMM) and (c) proposed PDMM (p-PDMM)
in a distributed least squares application.
important parameters including accuracy, convergence rate,
communication cost and privacy level.
We simulated a distributed network by generating a random
graph with n = 20 nodes and the communication radius r was
set at r2 = 2 lognn so ensure that the graph is connected with
high probability [48]. For simplicity, all the private data in
each application are randomly generated from a Gaussian dis-
tribution with unit variance, and all the optimization variables
are initialized with zeros. Additionally, from Proposition 2,
we initialize the dual variables with a Gaussian distribution
with a variance of 102, 104, and 106, thereby ensuring that
the privacy loss is approximately 7 × 10−3, 7 × 10−5, and
7× 10−7 bits, respectively.
A. General applicability
In Fig. 2, 3 and 4, we compare the convergence behavior of
the proposed subspace perturbation methods (blue lines) with
traditional non-private approaches (red lines) by using three
distributed optimizers in three applications: distributed aver-
age consensus, least squares and LASSO. More specifically,
the blue lines indicate that the dual variables are randomly
initialized with a variance of 106, such that the non-convergent
component (blue line with triangle markers) can protect the
private data, whereas the red lines mean that the dual variables
are initialized within the convergent subspace, and the private
data are therefore not protected, because the non-convergent
component is zero (the red lines with triangle markers are not
shown in the plots). We can see that the proposed approach
has no effect on the accuracy, because all the optimization
variables converge to the same optimum solution as the non-
private counterparts. Overall, we can conclude that
1) the proposed approach is able to achieve both accuracy
and privacy simultaneously;
2) it is able to solve a variety of convex problems;
3) it is generally applicable to a broad range of distributed
convex optimization methods.
B. Privacy level-invariant convergence rate
Another important aspect to quantify the performance is the
influence on the convergence rate when considering privacy.
Because the convergence rates of the discussed distributed
Fig. 6: Performance comparison: convergence behavior under
three differential privacy levels using the proposed p-PDMM,
p-ADMM and an existing differential privacy (DP) approach.
optimizers depend only on the underlying graph topologies
rather than the initializations, initializing the dual variable with
greater variance, i.e., a higher privacy level can be obtained,
will therefore not change the convergence rate; and it will only
result in only a larger offset in the initial error. To validate
these results, in Fig. 5 we show the convergence behavior
of the proposed approaches in the distributed least squares
problem under three different privacy levels by assigning
the noise variance as 102, 104 or 106. As expected, in all
optimizers, the convergence rate remains identical regardless
of the privacy level.
C. Comparison with differential privacy
To demonstrate the benefits of the proposed method, in Fig.
6, we compare the proposed approaches (both p-PDMM and
p-ADMM) with a differential privacy approach [49] by using
the distributed average consensus application. We consider
three cases in which the noise variance is set at 0, 102, 104.
We can see that the accuracy of the differential privacy
approach decreases with increasing privacy level. Hence, there
is a trade-off between privacy and accuracy. Additionally, the
convergence rates of differential privacy approaches will also
be affected when increasing the level of privacy, because noise
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Fig. 7: Normalized mutual information of an arbitrary node
i (i.e., I(Si;X
(k+1)
i )
I(Si;Si)
) using the proposed p-PDMM and non-
private PDMM (n-PDMM) for each iteration.
is inserted at every iteration, and a higher privacy level will
also result in a slower convergence rate.
D. Information loss over the iterative process
To visualize how the information loss behaves during the
iterative process, we perform 105 Monte Carlo simulations
and estimate the normalized mutual information I(Si;X
(k+1)
i )
I(Si;Si)
of distributed average consensus using the non-parametric
entropy estimation toolbox (npeet) [50]. In Fig. 7, we show
the estimated normalized mutual information of the proposed
p-PDMM with a noise variance of 106 and traditional non-
private PDMM, in which the dual variables are initialized
with zeros. We can see that both approaches ultimately have
the same information loss; i.e., the lower bound is I∗i =
I(Si;X
∗
i ), because they all converge to the same average result
x∗i = n
−1∑
i∈N si. As expected, the information loss of the
proposed p-PDMM never exceeds the lower bound; hence, the
proposed approach achieves perfect security. However, the n-
PDMM reveals all the information about si at the first iteration,
i.e., I(Si;X
(1)
i ) = I(Si;Si) because x
(1)
i =
si
1+cdi
based on
(30); thus the privacy is not protected at all.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a novel and general subspace perturbation
method was proposed for privacy-preserving distributed op-
timization. As a noise insertion approach, this method is
more practical than SMPC based approaches in terms of both
computation and communication costs. Additionally, by insert-
ing noise in subspace, it circumvents the trade-off between
privacy and accuracy in traditional noise insertion approaches
such as differential privacy. Moreover, the proposed method
is generally applicable to various optimizers and all convex
problems. Furthermore, we consider both eavesdropping and
passive adversary models; in the former case, only secure
channel encryption in the initialization is required, and in the
latter case, the private data of each honest node are protected
as long as the node has one honest neighbor.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof.
I(X1, . . . , Xn;Z1, . . . , Zn)
= h(Z1, . . . , Zn)− h(Z1, . . . , Zn|X1, . . . , Xn)
(a)
= h(Z1, . . . , Zn)− h(Y1, . . . , Yn)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
h
(
Zi|Z1, . . . , Zi−1
)− n∑
i=1
h
(
Yi
)
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
h
(
Zi)−
n∑
i=1
h(Yi)
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi)
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi/σZi ;Z
′
i).
Step (a) holds, as h(Zi|Xi) = h(Yi), (b) holds from the chain
rule of differential entropy and the condition that the Yi’s
are independent random variables, (c) holds, as conditioning
decreases entropy, (d) holds, as h
(
Zi) − h(Yi) = h(Zi) −
h(Zi|Xi) = I(Xi;Zi), and (e) holds from the fact that mutual
information is scaling invariant. As a consequence,
lim
σ2Yi
→∞
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi) = lim
σZi→∞
n∑
i=1
I(Xi/σZi ;Z
′
i)
=
n∑
i=1
I(0;Z ′i) = 0.
For the case Wi = XiYi, we have
h(Wi|Xi) =
∫
p(Xi)h(Wi|Xi = xi)dXi
=
∫
p(xi)h(XiYi|Xi = xi)dXi
(a)
=
∫
p(xi)h(Yi)dXi = h(Yi),
where (a) holds, because the probability measure of the event
Xi = 0 is zero. Hence, the proof of our second claim follows
the same lines as the one presented above, and we conclude
that
lim
σ2Yi
→∞
I(X1, . . . , Xn;W1, . . . ,Wn)
≤ lim
σWi→∞
∑
i∈N
I(Xi/σWi ;W
′
i ) = 0,
thereby proving our claims. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. As X and Y are independent, we have σ2Z = σ
2
X +
σ2Y . For a Gaussian random variable with variance σ
2, the
differential entropy is given by 12 log(2pieσ
2), so that
I(X;Z) = h(Z)− h(Y )
(a)
≤ 1
2
log(2pieσ2Z)−
1
2
log(2pieσ2Y )
=
1
2
log(1 + σ2X/σ
2
Y ), (37)
12
where (a) holds, because the maximum entropy of a random
variable with fixed variance is achieved by a Gaussian distri-
bution. 
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